Asilomar Returns: How It All Began and Why It Still Shapes Science Today
The 1975 Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA in California, USA, was a turning point in scientific self-regulation, establishing safety guidelines for genetic engineering that still influence policy today. Led by Paul Berg, the conference addressed growing concerns over biohazards, shaping the future of biotech while preventing government crackdowns. Its legacy can be seen in global biosafety frameworks, from GMO regulations to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Now, 50 years later, scientists have reconvened to tackle new challenges like AI-driven biotech and biosecurity threats. What did scientists learn from Asilomar, and will history repeat itself? How do we balance innovation with caution? And how can EU citizens play a role in shaping the future of science policy?
Protests agianst GMOs have marked the last twenty years, but how did GMO policy started in the US and Europe? (picture credits: unknown)
Paul Berg was born in 1926, the son of Russian immigrants in the United States. He grew up during a transformative period for biology when science was making significant breakthroughs. In 1944, Oswald Avery and his team discovered that DNA - not protein - was the molecule of heredity. Then, in 1953, James Watson, Francis Crick, and Rosalind Franklin elucidated the double-helix structure of DNA. These discoveries captivated Berg, fueling his interest in molecular biology.
After earning his Ph.D. in biochemistry in 1952, Berg began his research career in molecular biology at Washington University. He later joined Stanford University, working alongside Arthur Kornberg, who won the 1959 Nobel Prize for isolating DNA polymerase, an enzyme critical for DNA replication. In 1967, Kornberg's team successfully replicated the DNA of a small virus, calling it a "primitive form of life." This milestone marked the beginning of genetic engineering. (7)
By 1970, Berg's lab was exploring the use of SV40 - a cancer-causing monkey virus - as a vector to transfer bacterial DNA into human cells. This research was led by Janet Mertz, a doctoral candidate in his lab. During a Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory summer course, Mertz discussed her work with Robert Pollack, the course leader. He advised Mertz and her colleagues to think about not only what could be done scientifically but also what should be done. He cautioned that although SV40 was not known to cause disease in humans, it could induce tumours in rodents and human cells in culture. If SV40-infected bacteria escaped the laboratory, it could spread to the environment, potentially infecting humans and other mammals with cancer. (2)
Pollack contacted Berg directly to express his concerns. Though initially resistant, Berg ultimately agreed to halt the project and refrained from introducing SV40 into E. coli. This decision became a pivotal moment in the early discussions about bioethics and the safety of genetic engineering.
"Surrender a portion of the scientist's right to follow his nose without regard to consequences"
-Robert Pollack, extracted from a letter to the editors of Nature and Science, written by Robert Pollack and Robert Sambrook in June 1971 (1)
Berg's team halted their initial line of research with SV40. Instead, in 1972, they achieved a breakthrough: splicing a segment of bacterial virus DNA along with three E. coli genes into the DNA of SV40. Using specialised enzymes to cut and stitch the DNA back together, they laid the foundation for genetic engineering. However, this process was lengthy and complex at the time, requiring six different enzymes. It was far from practical for the average researcher in the field. (8)
That changed in 1973 when Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer at the University of California streamlined the process. They performed similar experiments but used just two enzymes, making genetic recombination much simpler and more accessible. (4) "It made it possible for anybody to do anything," (5) Berg later remarked.
(Left to right) Paul Berg, Herbert Boyer, Stanley Cohen in the 70s
As the technique became widely available, concerns about its safety grew. These concerns set the stage for the historic Asilomar Conference in 1975, where scientists gathered to address the potential risks of genetic engineering and establish guidelines for safe research practices.
Asilomar Conference on recombinant DNA technology
In 1973, with growing concerns about the potential risks of recombinant DNA technology, Paul Berg and Robert Pollack organised a meeting at the Asilomar Conference Center in California. About 100 scientists gathered to discuss the biohazards of emerging biological research. The focus of the meeting was primarily on laboratory safety - addressing practices like mouth pipetting and inadequate containment protocols. (9) However, the conversation did not venture into ethical concerns or broader societal fears, such as Pollack's. Instead, the scientists reassured themselves that everything was within their control. But the reality was more complicated than they realised.
A few months later, Berg began receiving frequent requests from other scientists asking for the reagents and materials to perform his recombinant DNA technique. "You'd ask the person whether, in fact, he'd thought about it, and you found that he really hadn't thought about it at all," Berg later recalled. He soon discovered that one of his students had gone behind his back to collaborate with Boyer and Cohen, successfully cloning vertebrate DNA for the first time. (10) It became clear that things were beginning to spiral beyond his control.
"You'd ask the person whether, in fact, he'd thought about it, and you found that he really hadn't thought about it at all."
— Paul Berg, Asilomar tapes, 1975 (11)
The scientific community was now divided, and debates over recombinant DNA technology spread beyond research circles and into the scientific press. In 1974, Berg and prominent scientists like Boyer, Cohen, and James Watson co-authored a letter published simultaneously in Science, Nature, and Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. The letter urged scientists around the world to halt potentially dangerous experiments - particularly those involving the creation of antibiotic-resistant, cancer-causing, or toxic organisms - until proper safety guidelines could be developed. (12)
The letter also announced plans for a second meeting at Asilomar in February 1975. Unlike the first meeting, this gathering would address containment strategies and the long-term future of recombinant DNA research on a much larger scale. Berg, hoping to find guidance from past precedents or regulations in similar fields, searched for existing frameworks governing research like recombinant DNA - and found nothing. He realised that Asilomar would have to fill this void, creating new standards for a rapidly evolving field with far-reaching implications for science and society.
A divided scientific community
Not all scientists were happy about the temporary halt to research. Philip Abelson, then editor of science, expressed concern that the Asilomar conference would unnecessarily alarm the public and lead to restrictive regulations on recombinant DNA research.
“It obviously was a little distressing to have people say, “we’re gonna put a moratorium on your project.” I thought it was a really good project. I was just a lowly grad student at the time, and as I say, it was above my pay grade.”
- Janet Mertz, interview for Science History Institute (13)
James Watson shared similar worries, opposing any regulation despite co-signing the 1974 letter. Others, like Nobel laureate John Kendrew, questioned whether scientists had the inherent right to pursue knowledge at all costs. "It may lead us to question scientists' common and generally unspoken assumption that the acquisition of new knowledge is always an absolute good, requiring no justification, no ethical sanction," Kendrew remarked during the 1975 meeting.
The organising committee hoped the conference would help settle these disagreements and establish clear guidelines for safe research - preferably without government intervention. The conference brought together 188 scientists from 16 countries, including 139 from the U.S., 20 from Europe, and the rest from Asia. (6) However, diversity was notably lacking; Maxine Singer was the only woman in attendance, the global south wasn’t represented, and early-career scientists were scarce. The majority of participants were senior researchers, reflecting the hierarchical and insular nature of scientific leadership at the time.
However, the conference struggled to find consensus. Watson bluntly pointed out that they couldn't even measure the risks of recombinant DNA experiments. Paul Berg later recalled, "They put the fear of God into the audience." Lawyers and ethicists were also invited to participate in the debate. Alex Capron, then a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania, didn't hold back in his criticism. He argued that scientists weren't equipped to assess the broader risks of their work.
"This group is not competent to judge the risk-benefit ratio of experiments […] That is a social decision, as is the judgment on benefit itself."
- Alex Capro, Asilomar tapes, 1975 (11)
“Yeah, well, it just proves that these guys can be as precise and well defined in the laboratory, but they are no better off at making policy than anybody else. I won’t quarrel with that. I won’t, I won’t put them down for this. It’s just that there is no monopoly or no greater sense of wisdom here than there is in any other human enterprise. Jesus.”
-David Perlman, San Francisco Chronicle, Asilomar tapes, 1975 (6)
Despite the disagreements, the conference organisers were determined to produce a formal document with clear recommendations. On the final night, they worked through the night and into the early morning to draft the document. The resulting statement emphasised caution and introduced a framework for categorising research into four tiers of risk based on potential threats. It outlined containment strategies for laboratory facilities, strict safety protocols, and ongoing review of the guidelines, with the flexibility to tighten or loosen restrictions as more became known about recombinant DNA technology. (14)
Not everyone at Asilomar signed the statement, but the majority did. Berg later described the moment: "We felt that we'd just written the Declaration of Independence." (6) Soon after, the National Institutes of Health's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee adopted interim rules based on the Asilomar guidelines, and research resumed.
However, as journalists reported on the Asilomar conference, the discussion of recombinant DNA technology entered the national discourse. For the first time, the American public was drawn into the debate, raising new questions about the future of genetic engineering and the role of scientists in shaping society.
After Asilomar
While public debate intensified, Harvard University applied for permission to build a high-containment facility for genetic research, which became a flashpoint for the controversy. At the time, Cambridge Mayor Al Vellucci seized the opportunity to escalate the conversation, warning that scientists were on the verge of creating "incurable diseases" or even "some kind of monster." "Is this the answer to Dr. Frankenstein's dream?" Vellucci asked. "Whether this research takes place here or elsewhere, whether it produces good or evil, all of us stand to be affected by the outcome." (22)
The city council voted to hold public hearings on the proposal, and soon the national media amplified the story. (16) Reporters and sceptical residents, some waving American flags, packed City Hall. Science for the People, an activist organisation, distributed flyers claiming that Harvard scientists were planning "the creation of new and possibly dangerous forms of bacteria." (17, 18) The hearings brought Asilomar organisers to Cambridge, where they spent hours explaining the science, its potential benefits, and the strict safety protocols in place. The session lasted until 1 a.m. but did little to calm public fears.
Two weeks later, the city council voted for a three-month moratorium on recombinant DNA research and established a review board composed of city residents, an ethicist, an engineer, a nun, and a community activist (19). After months of lab visits at MIT and Harvard and over 100 hours of testimony, Cambridge became the first city to pass recombinant DNA legislation. The new law effectively brought NIH guidelines - originally intended for national oversight - to the local level.
Meanwhile, Berg embarked on a whirlwind campaign, meeting with mayors and university leaders across the country to educate them on the science and prevent what he called "preemptive strikes" against recombinant DNA research. Politicians and the public remained sceptical. New York Representative Richard Ottinger declared recombinant DNA technology "potentially devastating to the health and safety of the American people" and called for the imprisonment of researchers who violated NIH guidelines. By 1978, Congress was flooded with 16 proposed bills aiming to regulate genetic research. (15)
Paul Berg in a talk show discussing recombinant DNA technology against Ethan Signer who defended that recombinant DNA technology was risky, unpredictable, and dangerous, March 1977.
The scrutiny reached new heights as leaders in the field were called to testify before Congress, forced to publicly defend the very experiments they had once raised concerns about. (21) Berg warned lawmakers that attempts to "regulate the content and methods of scientific inquiry" could stifle the innovation that had made recombinant DNA technology possible. He also cautioned that harsh regulations could discourage young scientists from entering the field.
"It was immensely frustrating [for Berg and his colleagues] that they could not engineer the social situation the way they could engineer life."
— Luis Campos, science historian at Rice University during Asilomar meeting, 2025
In February 1978, Berg saw an opportunity to shift the narrative. He drafted a revision of his 1974 letter, pointing out that more than 250 recombinant DNA studies had been conducted without a single case of harm to humans or the environment. Ultimately, the letter was never published - it wasn't needed. Senator Edward Kennedy, faced with growing opposition from the scientific community, withdrew his support for his regulatory bill. (20) With public fears fading and no disasters materialising, legislative momentum evaporated. By late 1978, the NIH eased its guidelines, particularly for experiments involving E. coli.
In October 1980, two landmark events marked how much had changed since Asilomar just five years earlier. Genentech, a biotech company co-founded by Herbert Boyer in 1976, went public on the New York Stock Exchange. Its stock value doubled on its first day of trading, signalling the birth of the biotechnology industry. (23) That same day, Berg received news that he had been awarded the Nobel Prize for his pioneering work in molecular biology - the foundation of this new field. (24)
In his Nobel lecture, Berg reflected on the early fears surrounding recombinant DNA research, describing them as "an apprehension about probing the nature of life itself" and a fundamental question of "whether certain inquiries at the edge of our knowledge and ignorance should cease for fear of what we might discover or create." He urged scientists to continue exploring the unknown. "I, for one, would not shrink from that challenge," he declared. (25)
By January 1982, the NIH had further relaxed its guidelines, reducing restrictions on most recombinant DNA experiments. By 1983, the guidelines had mainly become voluntary. The controversy that had once gripped the nation quietly faded into history, and recombinant DNA research moved forward - unrestrained and with world-changing potential. (26)
Convention on Biological Diversity
Asilomar emphasised containment and risk management, which inspired global conversations on biosafety in biotechnology. However, the controversy around GMOs grew more substantially from the 1970s onwards. Monsanto's Bt crops controversy in the 1970s/80s and an increase in the environmental movement led to the world looking at biotechnology with different eyes. (27)
In 1992, the Earth Summit took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in response to the growing concern about human impact on biodiversity. This summit led to the signing of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which focused on biological diversity conservation, the use of components sustainability, and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from genetic resources (28), which is directly applied to Biotechnology. This treaty ended up having even more impact on Biotechnology research and commercialisation. (29)
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992 (Getty Images)
This summit also included the declaration on environment and development, which contained 27 principles underpinning sustainable development. One of them, principle 15, is commonly known as the precautionary principle, which would lay some fundamental groundwork for GMO policy in European Europe. (30) The principle states: 'In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.' (31)
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and Nagoya protocol
These principles and the concern related to GMO biosafety and biotechnology research led to the establishment of the Cartagena protocol. The protocol aimed to ensure a level of protection in the field of safe transfer related to 'living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology' that may have adverse effects on the environment and conservation. (32)
In 2010, the Nagoya Protocol was also added to the Convention on Biological Diversity Agreements. (33) It aims to maintain the conservation of biodiversity and ensure that the benefits from the use of genetic resources are fair and equitable.
Texts and annexes of Cartagena Portocol and Nogoya protocol are widely available online.
'Bioprospecting remains an important area of research to look for new compounds which can be commercially exploited [...] The Nagoya Protocol aims to ensure that a share of the benefits of that exploitation, such as drug production, goes back to the country where the genetic resource initially came from.'
-Chris Layal, Scientist at the Natural History Museum London (34)
Because of the Nagoya protocol, anyone who wants to study genetic material from a country should get permission to do the research first and share the benefits. For example, if anything gets commercialised from the research, the native country might get a share of the income. 'The benefits can be monetary, but for non-commercial research there could be training for local researchers, the deposit of specimens in that country's collections, or the sharing of research outcomes.', Chris Layal explains. (34)
The issue is that there is no definition of 'fair and equitable,' and there have been issues in agreeing on what monetary benefit would apply. Too much bureaucracy might lead to companies giving up on the projects or just moving to countries that do not apply the agreement. (35)
'The new rules will also present challenges for synthetic biologists, who combine genetic codes from many different organisms to create drugs or sensors. This could require dozens of ABS arrangements for a single product [...] Such bureaucracy could push European companies to countries - particularly the United States - that are not signatories'
-Tim Fell, chief executive of Synthace, a biotechnology company in London, Nature News, 2014 (35)
The Nagoya Protocol (NP) established a framework for benefit sharing, ensuring that the Global South receives proper credit and indigenous communities gain a share of profits from research. Some argue that CBD was not functioning properly on a purely voluntary basis, so the NP provides a framework to ensure benefit sharing. (38)
“The Nagoya Protocol is almost out of date from the get go. [...] It doesn't clearly cover utilization of genetic information, and, increasingly, information is what we get and what we transfer.”
-Kate Davis, International Biodiversity Policy (37)
However, critics highlight that the NP's complex and cumbersome requirements create challenges for stakeholders. The United States has not joined the protocol, and some countries, like Brazil, had pre-existing mechanisms for managing biological resources. Institutions such as the Natural History Museum in London had long-established systems for permits and compliance, which helped set early standards for benefit sharing.(38)
A shaman in Ecuador collects plants to prepare ayahuasca, which was at the heart of a biopiracy controversy. (Getty Images)
When the NP was introduced in 2014, uniform compliance instructions were required. As a result, many nations had to develop new regulations, adding complexity to existing frameworks. Genetic resource utilisation should prompt notification to the provider nation, yet by 2017, no such notifications had been filed. (38) The fragmented regulatory landscape - with up to 196 national laws and EU directives - further complicates compliance. This burden can be overwhelming; for example, Bavarian Natural History Collections Museum faced excessive paperwork, receiving 20 pages per specimen. (38)
Researchers sometimes face legal hurdles in obtaining permits for resources within their own country. Exporting materials for sequencing adds another layer of legal complexity. Environmental phenomena, such as Saharan dust storms, complicate the identification of genetic resource origins. “What is the country of origin? How do you want to regulate or govern this?” Dirk Neumann, from DNA collections of the Bavarian Natural History Collections, asks. Additionally, digital genetic data remains undefined in CBD/NP discussions, creating further uncertainty. The term "utilization" lacks a clear legal definition, raising concerns about enforcement. Environmental lawyers stress the importance of carefully worded contracts to ensure compliance.(38)
Despite these obstacles, the NP has driven significant advancements in equitable biotechnology. While challenges remain, the protocol represents a crucial step toward fair benefit-sharing in scientific research and has bought indigenous people to biotechnology governance (36).
GMO policy in Europe
The Asilomar Conference's international dimensions have received limited attention, with most studies focusing on specific countries (US, UK, France, Germany). The history of Europe with Asilomar has not been widely reported, but recently, the intersection of the EMBL foundry and Asilomar history has been elucidated. Berg invited EMBL member Sydney Brenner to join the Asilomar committee. Berg had met Brenner in Italy and Cambridge in the early 70s due to their interest in recombinant DNA technology.
"If the Conference is to be international in its representation and impact, [...] non-Americans must be involved in both organising the meeting and, more importantly, in generating the recommendations that come from the Conference."
-Paul Berg's correspondence to Sydney Brenner, 1974 (37)
EMBO ended up sponsoring the Conference and allocating travel grants so European researchers could go to California. EMBO delegates ended up drafting an official report on the Conference to the EMBC governments, recommending, first, that the Ashby Report and the Report of the Asilomar Conference be used as interim guidelines for European scientists experimenting with rDNA and, second, that EMBO establish a Standing Advisory Committee (SAC) on Recombinant DNA Molecules, for the "elaboration, co-ordination, surveillance and review of safety precautions" in this research area in Western Europe, and cooperation with other international organisations.
The history of EMBO, Asilomar and NIH was eventful (37). In the early 1980s, the regulation on recombinant DNA research had been relaxed, but in the second half of the 80s, due to West Germany becoming unstable politically, a public debate on genetic engineering started taking place, and a rather stringent Gene Technology Law (Gentechnikgesetz) was passed. The European Community (EC) also adopted two directives (90/219 and 90/220), one concerning the "contained use" of genetically modified micro-organisms, the other one the "deliberate release" of such organisms. These focused on genetic modification techniques rather than on the properties of the organisms generated or, in legislative parlance, on the process rather than the product, not taking into consideration the actual health and environmental risks. By 1990, two EC Directives, 90/219 and 90/220 were implemented, advocating a precautionary approach to regulation, which was the opposite of what the EMBO Council had suggested. (37)
Europe adopts a precautionary approach to policy regarding new technologies compared to the US, which is more risk-based. It is not possible to talk about GMO policy without talking about what happened late last century since the 1980s and 90s shaped Europe's behaviour around GMOs and its policy frameworks. (30)
The last century was marked by several biosafety controversies in Europe, exposing the dangers of inadequate safety assessments. (39) The Mad Cow Disease (BSE) crisis in the 1980s-1990s, caused by the UK's mishandling of contaminated beef, eroded public trust and pushed for stricter food safety policies under the precautionary principle. The Chornobyl nuclear disaster (1986) further reinforced European caution toward nuclear energy, GMOs, and chemicals due to their devastating long-term effects. Similarly, the Thalidomide scandal (1950s-1960s), which resulted in severe congenital disabilities, underscored the risks of poorly regulated pharmaceuticals and led to stricter EU drug safety laws. Nowadays, in new/disruptive technology, such as Synthetic Biology, the precautionary principle is applied to ensure its safety and sustainability. (30) Could there be a way to balance caution with innovation? Concepts like regulatory sandboxes or adaptive risk assessments might offer a middle ground where safety remains a priority, yet new possibilities aren't stifled before they even begin.
‘Robert Edwards was the man who invented in vitro fertilisation. Twenty-five years ago, when he was doing the preliminary experiments, I can tell you that the huge protests were the same as they are today for stem cells. People thought he was going to make monsters, that the was going to produce children who were going to be deformed and very incapacitated. So today we have a million, more than a million live births, many people who have had children they could not have had before, so 25 years later we recognise that this was a major health and medical benefit.’
-Paul Berg, Nobel Prize interview, 2001 (26)
The evolution of global biotechnology policy - from the Asilomar Conference to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Cartagena Protocol, and Nagoya Protocol - reflects a growing recognition of the risks and responsibilities of genetic innovation. While Asilomar set the stage for self-regulation in biotech, the Convention on Biological Diversity and its protocols institutionalised international safeguards, ensuring biosafety, fair genetic resource sharing, and ethical research practices. Shaped by past biosafety crises and strong public demand for precaution, Europe has embraced the precautionary principle more rigorously than other regions. This cautious approach prioritises environmental and health protection, reinforcing strict regulations on GMOs, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. As biotechnology advances, Europe's policies serve as a model for balancing innovation with long-term safety and sustainability.
‘Today, many people have criticised the Asilomar conference because it didn’t consider ethical and moral issues of the work.’ (Paul Berg, 2001)
Fifty years after the original Asilomar conference, the need for global dialogue on biotechnology has never been more urgent. From February 23rd to 26th, 2025, experts convened once again to address the most pressing challenges in the field: pathogen research and biological weapons, the intersection of artificial intelligence and biotechnology, synthetic cells, and innovative biotechnologies that push beyond conventional containment strategies. This time, greater emphasis was placed on diversity, with over 20 participants from the Global South - who had been excluded in the past - and 23 from Europe, although half of these came from the UK alone. The US remained the most represented country, with over 100 participants in attendance. Nonetheless, these conversations will shape the global policies that guide the next generation of genetic and technological innovations. Europe, in particular, could benefit from mobilising its youth to actively engage in these critical discussions. While GMO regulations in the EU have been tight for decades, the current global crisis - driven by climate change and environmental degradation - demands a reimagining of our approach. With the potential for biological production to drive up to 60% of the materials that power the global economy (31), the need for sustainable, non-polluting technologies is more pressing than ever. A real circular economy built on these advancements could be the key to preserving our planet for future generations. The time to act is now.